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The Bologna process seems to disregard one of the most significant recent developments in 
several major post-communist transition countries: the rise and rapid growth of the private 
sector in higher education and, more generally, the emergence of powerful market forces in 
higher education.* Consequently, the ideas behind the Bologna process – a major European 
integrating initiative in higher education started by the Bologna Declaration in 1999 – and 
analytical tools it provides to rethink the role of the university in increasingly knowledge-
based societies and economies, the wider picture of the social role of higher education, and 
policy recommendations it develops may have unanticipated and unconsidered and perhaps 
mixed effects on higher education systems in certain transition countries. Both globally and in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, private higher education is part of the problem 
and part of the solution. Consequently, both the private sector in European (and especially 
Central and East European) higher education systems and the emergence of powerful market 
forces in the educational and research landscape in Europe have to be further analyzed if the 
Bologna process is not to turn into a merely “theoretical”, myopic exercise. The downplaying 
of the role of market forces in higher education and research and development as presented by 
Bologna documents and the omission of the private sector which is booming in the transition 
countries from the scope of Bologna interests – and from its overall conceptual scheme – give 
potentially misguided signals to educational authorities in transition economies. 
Consequently, Bologna process might distort the development of the private sector in 
countries where chances for the expansion of the educational system otherwise than through 
privatization were or are limited. Also, while the implicit disrespect for market mechanisms in 
higher education may have limited impact in Western European systems which take many 
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market-related parameters of their operation for granted, it may have long-lasting negative 





Recent attempts at the revitalization of the so-called Lisbon strategy of the European Union 
(through such widely debated documents as e.g. the Wim Kok Report on the future of  the 
Lisbon strategy, EU 2004) seem to be going hand in hand with recent reformulations of the 
Bologna process (see Reichert and Tauch 2005). The future of Europe seems to be located in 
the “Europe of Knowledge”, to be achieved through redefined higher education gained from 
reformed educational institutions and through boosted research and development in both 
public and private sectors. New modes of viewing educational institutions are probed 
(universities as entrepreneurial providers of skilled workforce for the globalizing economy 
and students as individual clients/buyers of conveniently rendered educational services) and 
new ideas about citizens gaining enhanced European identity through education useful for 
knowledge-based Europe are presented. Consequently, in recent years the project of the 
European integration seems to have found a new motif: education and research for the 
“Europe of Knowledge”. A crucial component of the Europeanization process today is its 
attempt to make Europe a “knowledge society” (and a “knowledge economy”) in a 
globalizing world. “Education and training” (to use a more general EU category) becomes a 
core group of technologies to be used for the creation of a better integrated Europe; the 
creation of a distinctive and separate “European Higher Education Area” as well as a 
“European Research (and Innovation) Area” is the goal the EU has set itself by a deadline of 
2010. The construction of a distinctive European educational policy space – and the 
introduction of the requisite European educational and research polices – has become part and 
parcel of EU “revitalization” within the wide cultural, political and economic Europeanization 
project. Following recent vetoes to the European constitution, it is hard to judge the impact of 
these possibly large-scale political changes on European educational and research policies 
analyzed in the present paper, though. 
 
The success of the Bologna process in most general terms depends on the question to what 
extent it is going to function towards the goals of the Lisbon strategy. The goals of the Lisbon 
strategy, as initially formulated in 2000, were too multiple and they were going in too many 
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directions; consequently, most of them are not achievable. The Bologna process, again in 
general terms, is going to be successful if it is contributing to the reformulated Lisbon strategy 
goals, mostly directed towards closer links between education and employability (and no 
longer employment – see Neave 2001) of its graduates, lower unemployment rates and higher 
individual entrepreneurship of graduates. Higher education becoming more practical, shorter 
periods of study for the majority of students by clearly dividing studies into undergraduate 
and graduate ones and lowering the number of students at the MA level, greater intra-
European mobility of students through various EU-funded mobility schemes, a wider use of 
credit transfer systems, including their use on a national basis etc. – these are among major 
Bologna goals today coinciding clearly with the goals of the Lisbon strategy.  
 
We need to locate the private sector in higher education in this wider picture. As far as the 
countries of Western Europe where Bologna process was born are concerned, the role of the 
private sector is marginal. Major EU economies, including Germany, France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, do not have significant private sector in higher education. But the Bologna 
process runs far beyond Western Europe and involves the countries in which private higher 
education figures prominently, exceeding 10% of total enrollments in Hungary and Bulgaria, 
20% of enrollments in Romania and Estonia and 30% of enrollments in Poland. In Central 
and Eastern Europe, where all countries are Bologna signatory countries, there is over a 
thousand private institutions. So we are talking about a significant and rapidly developing 
segment of education – and economy – in transition countries. 
 
If we take a closer look at private institutions in transition countries, they serve a number of 
functions but are often still grappling for legitimacy. They appeared in most transition 
countries in a sort of legal vacuum, using both the enthusiasm for institutional autonomy and 
the appeal of hitherto nonexistent non-state educational institutions in new democracies. But 
after well over a decade, in most of these countries, they are legally well-positioned, no longer 
have to operate on the fringes of the system, are recognized by local national accreditation 
boards and seek higher social recognition. Their legitimacy has to be won over and over 
again, until they are fully accepted by the society, labor market and educational authorities, 
though. Private institutions were the simplest answer to the question of expansion of 
educational systems which under communist rule were elite, with enrollments in some cases 
(like Poland) five times smaller than today. The issue of legitimacy of the private sector, in 
many cases, boils down to the social recognition of the fact that it is providing affordable 
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higher education to young people who would have never had a chance to get it in closed elite 
and fully public systems of former communist countries. The sector found social recognition 
by opening the door of education to those who under previous conditions were cut off from it. 
In knowledge-based societies, being cut off from affordable education may easily lead to 
social exclusion and marginalization. It is not so important who provides the new “knowledge 
portfolio”, state-subsidized universities or financially independent, market-oriented private 
institutions, as long as the knowledge portfolio received via education corresponds to current 
and future labor market needs. The development of the private sector in many instances 
confirms the thesis that what matters is whether the services delivered correspond to social 
needs of graduates and satisfies their desire to be graduates from legitimate, respectable 
educational institutions. Apparently, these services are most often provided and these needs 
are most often satisfied by the emergent private higher education – which is testified by the 
existence of the sector with, in most cases, no public support. 
 
Thus, owing to the rapid development of the sector (and corresponding parallel expansion of 
the public sector, following the suit), in some CEE countries higher education became an 
affordable product and private institutions needed more permanent legitimacy to be able to 
sell the product for subsequent incoming cohorts of students. The point in relation to the 
Bologna process and the revitalization of Europe through education is that most ideas 
developed in theory in Western Europe and referred to as the “Bologna process” were actually 
applied in practice in the private sector in CEE countries already in the 1990s, before the ideas 
of the Bologna process were formulated. The Lisbon strategy in general, and the EU 
publications about the “European Research Area” in particular, stress the importance of 
market forces, individual entrepreneurialism of graduates and new modes of governance in 
academic institutions; both underlie the perspective of the end-user of knowledge, the student 
– rather than its provider, the academic institution. The overall emphasis goes away from the 
respectable and trustful institution and towards the consumer of educational services. Private 
institutions are not subsidized by the state (except for some cases, such as e.g. student loans or 
student stipends, and – to a very limited extent – research); they are almost fully subsidized by 
students who actually buy off their teaching services. Its legitimacy is provided by students 
and their families who recognize them as respected institutions which provide services worth 
being paid for. In most cases, they are undergraduate institutions providing practical 
knowledge, skills and expertise relevant to the national (and sometimes international) labor 
market. They adapt their curricula as the needs arise, open short-term courses, offer MBA 
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programs, liaise with foreign institutions and offer double degrees, provide distance 
education, weekend education and other modes of learning convenient to the student. They 
monitor the labor market, open career centers seeking good jobs for their graduates and 
introduce strict internal quality assurance mechanisms. They follow market mechanisms in 
their functioning as business units, use public relations and marketing tools to have significant 
portions of local, regional or national educational “markets”, and finally prepare their 
graduates to living and working in market realities. All the above aspects represented by the 
private sector in transition countries – and, to a large extent, juxtaposed to most lower-level 
public institutions in these countries – correspond closely to what Lisbon strategy in general 
suggests for the education sector in the future. 
 
But the direction of the Bologna process with respect to the Lisbon strategy is unclear: 
consequently, the present paper argues that the downplaying of the role of market forces in 
higher education and research and development and the omission of the private sector which 
is booming in the transition countries from the overall conceptual scheme of the Bologna 
process give potentially misguided signals to educational authorities, students and faculty in 
some transition countries, especially those where the private sector has not been strong. 
Consequently, Bologna process might even distort the smooth development of the private 
sector in those countries where chances for the expansion of the educational system otherwise 
than through (various forms of) privatization are limited. The implicit disrespect for market 
mechanisms in higher education may have limited impact in Western European systems but 
may have long-lasting negative impact on legislation and general attitude toward the market 




The Bologna process has come to be viewed as part and parcel of wider processes of 
European integration intended to lead to the emergence of the “Europe of Knowledge” and to 
the preservation of a distinctive European social model. The Bologna process is based on the 
underlying assumptions that both Europe and the world are entering a new era of knowledge-
based and market-driven economies which are competing against each other; Europe as a 
region has to struggle with its two main competitors in higher education and research and 
development: the USA and Japan (or wider, Australasia); the knowledge society depends for 
its growth on the production, transmission, dissemination, and use of new knowledge;  Europe 
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is trying to combine higher competitiveness and social cohesion in an increasingly globalized 
world and it is in the process of transition towards a “knowledge society”.  
 
But the differences between higher education and research in the old EU Member States (EU-
15) and the new EU entrants, not to mention other East European Bologna signatory 
countries, in general, are critical. Higher education in the majority of Bologna-signatory 
transition countries has been in a state of permanent crisis for over a decade now. While 
higher education systems in Western European countries seem to face largely new challenges 
brought about by the emergence of the knowledge-based economy, globalization and market-
related pressures, most of the Bologna signatory transition countries, to varying degrees, face 
old challenges as well, with the need of the expansion of their systems at the forefront. The 
Bologna process in general seems to focus mostly on new challenges and new problems; most 
transition countries, by contrast, are still embedded in old-type problems generated mostly in 
a recent decade by the massification of higher education under severe resource constraints.  
 
While, apparently, the rapidly developing private sector is not problematic for the Bologna 
process in Western Europe (and perhaps therefore it has not been dealt with in the Bologna 
documents so far), it certainly is a problem (problem and/or solution) for some biggest 
transition countries, including Poland and Romania. The role of the private sector there is 
significant. So far, by ignoring  this sector in CEE countries, and thereby ignoring powerful 
market forces and market mechanisms in higher education, the Bologna process is indirectly 
refusing its legitimacy to this sector. And this sector is often closer to the recommendations of 
the Lisbon Agenda than the public sector in higher education. The Bologna game in higher 
education is the most powerful game in town in most transition countries; for most 
governments, it provides the best rationale available for reforming the systems which have not 
been transformed in most of them in recent 10-15 years. Subsequent transition countries join 
the process and the number of signatory countries already exceeds forty. Bologna provides the 
major impetus for otherwise static systems, and the idea of catching up with a larger European 
trend is often much better received by the general public in these countries than in Western 
European countries. Even more, in some non-EU transition countries following Bologna 
requirements is even regarded as bringing the country closer to the EU, or seen as a temporary 
substitute for EU membership (for a panorama of higher education policies in CEE countries, 
see Tomusk 2004). 
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The Bologna process documents should recognize the importance of market mechanisms in 
higher education in countries where they do not exist so far (a bulk of transition economies), 
and should recognize the important role of the private sector in those transition countries in 
which there does not seem to be a chance for the expansion of the higher education system 
without introducing the private sector. Major guiding threads for Western European 
institutions – as Bologna process looks today – may not be enough to guide institutions in 
transition countries. Blind acceptance of the Bologna process, and especially blind acceptance 
of its general conceptual framework and resulting conceptual and analytical omissions, may 
have far reaching consequences for educational systems in these countries. The future of the 
private sector in transition countries is a good example here. There are crucial differences 
between reforms in Western Europe and in post-communist transition countries (see Radó 
2001). Bologna-related reforms undertaken in Western Europe are much more functional 
(fine-tuning, slight changes etc); reforms in most transition countries, by contrast, need to be 
much more substantial (or structural).  
 
The Bologna process is one of the most ambitious transformations of higher education 
systems on a regional scale in the world today. Its impact on the future of European higher 
education is potentially deep and long. And at the same time, unfortunately, the process seems 
to disregard the rise and rapid growth of the private sector and, more generally, the emergence 
of powerful market forces. The refusal of recognition of the process is an attempt to refuse 
legitimacy to the whole sector. The fact that Bologna process in its documents does not use 
the word “market” or the word “private”, in transition countries which still have their systems 
in flux, and still do not know how to expand access to higher education under severe state 
underfunding, means the refusal of the legitimacy of the sector, the rejection  of the 
competition between the public and private sectors, and the implicit suggestion that the 
existence of market mechanisms in teaching and research is fundamentally wrong. 
Consequently, the ideas behind Bologna, analytical tools it provides, the wider picture of the 
role of higher education in society and economy, and policy recommendations it develops, 
may have unanticipated and unconsidered and perhaps mixed effects on higher education 
systems, especially in Eastern (rather than Central) Europe  where it is still possible to grant 
or refuse legitimacy e.g. through new legislation. In the countries with the biggest share of 
enrollments in the private sector, it is impossible to refuse legitimacy to private higher 
education now that it has full social and legal recognition but in those countries in which the 
private sector is only beginning to be formed, an implicit “no” from the Bologna process to 
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the sector – and to market forces in education  in general – may have far-reaching 
consequences for further expansion of national higher education systems. Bologna process, to 
be an effective integrating tool on a European scale, needs to take into account the 
fundamental difference between Western European countries and some transition countries 
with respect to the role of the private sector and market mechanisms. The private sector is 
most often and in most transition countries (especially in Central Europe) a socially 
legitimate, fully legal and future-oriented part of higher education systems; to a large extent, it 
is socially accepted and recognized as legitimate provider of skilled workforce to the national 
economy and is recognized by the labor market.  
 
This is not exactly a sheer omission, though: by ignoring a large-scale social (and economic) 
phenomenon, the private sector in education for some unspecified reasons is refused 
legitimacy within the Bologna process. It is legitimate in the eyes of national populations in 
most transition countries in which it functions more than marginally – but it is not legitimate, 
by being omitted, within an ongoing integration of European higher education systems. This 
may be confusing for governments, students and even faculty teaching in the sector. It is also 
important to note that in many transition countries things have not got changed in the public 
education sector substantially in recent 10-15 years and these countries still need to expand 
hugely their systems. Without the private sector, without market forces and additional non-
state funding, and resulting competition between the private and the public sector, without 
lower-level professionally-oriented private institutions (of the academic level of the American 
community colleges), the proportion of young people pursuing higher education will not 
correspond to global and European trends (US – about 70% and Western Europe – about 50% 
of the relevant age cohort). Also the rejection of market forces from the conceptual 
framework provided by the Bologna process (in contrast to the EU Lisbon strategy and the 
European Commission’s publications about the future of European universities) may have far-
reaching consequences in transition countries in which public funding for higher education 
and research and development is very low and other social needs are equally, if not more, 
pressing, to mention healthcare and old-age pensions. Bologna process implicitly uses the 
assumptions which hold in Western European welfare state regimes (especially Continental 
and Scandinavian, much less South European and Anglo-Saxon) but which cannot and should 
not be taken for granted in countries which are still grappling with finding welfare state 
regimes which are affordable to them. 
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At the same time the role of the private sector in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe  
– considering its ability to adapt to the new societal needs and new market conditions 
combined with the drastically underfunded and still unreformed public institutions with 
limited capacities to enroll larger numbers of students – and despite its lack of recognition on 
the part of the Bologna process is bound to grow. Private institutions represent a wide variety 
of missions, organizational frameworks, legal status and relations to the established 
institutional order. There are significant differences between particular countries of the region, 
too. There is a growing need for clear policies (resulting also in thoughtful legislation) with 
respect to this sector and powerful market mechanisms in higher education and the Bologna 
process could clearly provide some guidance to the transition countries if it wants to maintain 
its coherence throughout enlarged Europe, and beyond, and for the simple reason that it 
provides the major impetus for reforms in educational systems in numerous transition 
countries; the policy of not seeing these issues in the long run may be counter-productive. 
What is certainly needed is the disinterested analysis of the current (in-transition) state of 
affairs, largely unexplored so far in international educational research, and conclusions as to 
how to deal, in theory and in practice, with growing market forces in education; how to 
regulate privatization and corporatization of educational institutions and research activities 
within ongoing reform attempts, and finally how to accommodate principles of the “European 
Research Area” and requirements of the Bologna process to local conditions of those new EU 
countries where the private sector has recently grown surprisingly strong and especially to 
those Bologna signatory countries where without developing private higher education the 
expansion of higher education and significant raise in enrollments seem difficult to achieve. 
 
The old EU-15 (with notable exceptions of e.g. the UK or the Netherlands) is one of the few 
remaining places in the world which are relatively resistant to market forces in higher 
education and in university research (at least declaratively, as seen from documents on the 
European level; in practice the situation may be much different); again, some countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, for a variety of institutional, political and economic reasons, 
seem to be much more influenced by market forces and their higher education institutions are 
already operating in highly competitive, market-driven and customer-driven environments. At 
the same time, from a global perspective, there should not be much doubt about the direction 
of changes in the public sector generally: less state, more market (see Kwiek 2004). My guess 
is that no matter whether the Bologna process documents and analyses mention the 
phenomenon or not, the change is already taking place and more market forces in numerous 
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places have already come to European higher education institutions. The world today seems 
too strongly interrelated to assume that although market forces are affecting higher education 
globally, and the private sector is generally booming globally, the last bastion of resistance 
will be the signatory countries of the Bologna process in Continental Europe (especially that 
the market forces have already come as part of a much wider package of ongoing or 
envisaged institutional changes of the welfare state model and they will not go away). 
 
In some transition countries which are still in the process of deciding what to do with their 
educational systems and how to expand them, the lesson of Bologna may be confusing. They 
might be inclined to follow strictly the letter, but also the spirit of Bologna reforms, and 
consequently to refuse legitimacy to emergent forms of private sector in their countries. The 
impact of the specific conceptual apparatus of the Bologna process – formed by Western 
Europeans for Western Europeans who do not give legitimacy to the private sector in 
education and market forces in education in most general terms – may be especially strong in 
those least developed transition countries where the Bologna process is viewed as a 
substitution for EU membership. For countries with strong market traditions, like Poland, 
Bologna’s peculiar way of viewing higher education does not matter as much as for Kosovo, 
Albania, Macedonia or Bosnia and Herzegovina which are only beginning to think about 
expanding their systems and increasing access to their systems. 
 
Reflecting the ideas of the European Commission more than those of the Bologna process, the 
private sector is mostly vocationally-oriented, provides practical knowledge and experience, 
and it is there that the student and teaching is in the center, as opposed to traditional public 
universities which are still faculty-oriented. The overall perspective provided by the Bologna 
processes – readable and comparable degrees, two cycles of studies, undergraduate and 
graduate courses,  European-oriented development of new curricula etc – has been smoothly 
implemented in numerous private institutions in the region in recent decade or so without 
using the Bologna label. The indirect refusal of legitimacy to the private sector and the market 
forces in higher education within the Bologna process does not seem to mean much for such 
countries as e.g. Poland. Here the sector is well-developed, solid and has full legitimacy, both 
in legal and in social terms. But in other Bologna signatory countries in Eastern Europe (and 
perhaps in the Balkans and the Caucasus), this implicit stance towards the sector and explicit 
stance towards the market mechanisms in education in general may lead to the adoption of 
policies and laws which might make further expansion of national higher education systems 
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almost impossible. In the context of the “Europe of Knowledge”, this is the worst-case 
scenario. Without introducing market mechanisms and facilitating access to higher education 
to larger part of the young population, the universal higher education and competitiveness of 
highly skilled European nations which is at the core of Western European ideas behind the 
Bologna process can be very difficult to be reached. Taking Bologna process too seriously, in 
these transition countries in which access to studies is limited and where private higher 
education is not available may have undesired and unintended social consequences, increasing 




In view of global developments, the powerful presence of both the private sector and market 
forces more generally in higher education should not be disregarded in thinking about the 
future “Europe of Knowledge”, and should not be omitted in the conceptual scheme of the 
ongoing Bologna process. So far, within the Bologna process, the two issues are virtually non-
existent. There is an important difference in this regard between the Bologna process and the 
parallel process of the emergence of the European Research Area (stimulated, funded and 
coordinated by the European Commission). There is an interesting discrepancy between 
documents, communiqués and reports produced in recent years within the two ongoing 
processes with regard to the role of the market forces in higher education and in research and 
development. At the same time, the refusal of legitimacy to private higher education and the 
market forces in education in general within the Bologna process may lead to the limitation in 
the expansion of higher education system as a whole in numerous transition countries where 
the private sector has not been developed so far. The consequences for the integration of 
Europe (or a larger than the Europe of the EU – from Portugal to the Caucasus) in higher 
education may be long-lasting there: we might have almost universal elite, difficult-to-reach 
higher education with limited chances for further expansion.  
 
Private higher education and strong market forces in operation in education in transition 
countries require careful analysis in European educational research. Virtually unknown in the 
old EU-15, they may indicate more global trends and tendencies, to be seen in the old EU-15 
in the future. Both serious problems and excellent solutions brought about by the private 
sector in transition countries deserve careful academic attention. The Bologna process, 
neglecting these developments, is an example how experiences in the peripheral European 
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countries can be out of research focus today; it is therefore very interesting to follow the 
consequences of this omission in the transition countries while the process is being 
implemented, and react accordingly. In the context of European postcommunist transition 
countries, I fully agree with Daniel C. Levy who notes – without developing the point – that a 
dramatic emergence of private higher education  
 
[R]esults in part from powerful global tendencies that limit the financial role of the 
state, privatize, and internationalize in overall development policy. These are 
tendencies from beyond higher education policy. … Private roles largely emerge 
outside higher education policy, from non-higher education changes (Levy 2002: 8, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Consequently, future roles of higher education institutions, including private ones, may be 
severely dependent on the future roles of the state, the scope and variation of the welfare state 
regime to be adopted in particular transition countries; the direction for future research is thus 
to trace Bologna failures and successes in national contexts, and discuss them in a wider 
European context – both of which reach beyond merely higher education policies. 
Increasingly, the contexts for research may be related to transformations of the state/market 
relationships, the retrenchment of the welfare state and the reformulation of the functioning of 
the public sector in general (which I am doing elsewhere, see Kwiek 2005). 
 
* This is a much shortened version of a paper whose full version is forthcoming in a book 
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